The National Security Agency’s (NSA) recent push for quantum-only cryptography has led to uncomfortable air among security experts. The experts have said that it could accidentally add backdoors to security protocols that are already widely used.
Peter Todd, one of the early developers of Bitcoin, wrote in a recent post on X, that the rollout of quantum-secure algorithms seems to be meant to get rid of hybrid protections that use both traditional and quantum‑resistant methods.
Crypto analysts including Todd, say that hybrid approaches are like a “seatbelt” that keeps both systems safe. An attack would have to break both systems for it to work. Switching to quantum‑only standards takes away that important safety net.
Daniel J. Bernstein, a cryptographer, initially highlighted the issue on October 5. In his blog post, he said that post‑quantum cryptography that isn’t hybrid could make TLS protocols less secure, making them easier to hack for people with advanced skills. The draft, which suggests new ways to moderate IETF standards, has also been criticized for possibly silencing dissent and ignoring valid objections from the wider technical community.
He even talked in an X post about the technical risks, saying that quantum‑only algorithms get rid of redundancy and make systemic vulnerabilities more likely. On the other hand, hybrid methods make it harder for attackers to get past both classical and quantum‑secure layers, adding another layer of protection.
Many experts are urging developers, researchers, and IETF members to voice objections before the October 7, 2025 deadline. Their motives are to continue using hybrid cryptography during the transition to post‑quantum systems and avoid rushing standards that could compromise global digital security.